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KEEPING KIDNAPPING IN ITS PLACE: WHEN
DOES THE KENTUCKY EXEMPTION APPLY?
INTRODUCTION
At common law, the offense of kidnapping was narrowly
defined as "the forcible abduction or stealing away of a man,
woman, or child, from their own country, and sending them
into another. . . ."I Today, the offense covers a much broader
range of situations as it is defined by state statutes. For exam-
ple, although the statutes are greatly diversified, kidnapping is
most commonly described in terms of seizing, confining, re-
moving, detaining, restraining, inveigling, enticing, decoying,
abducting, concealing, or some combination of those acts.
2
Some jurisdictions also draw a distinction between simple and
aggravated kidnapping.3 This too may vary, however, in that
some jurisdictions turn the distinction on whether a ransom is
demanded,4 while in other states, the distinction is whether the
victim suffers bodily harm.5 However, regardless of the defini-
tion, kidnapping is no longer limited to the crossing of interna-
tional boundaries as it was at common law.6
The status of kidnapping has also changed in that most
modern statutes now classify the offense as a felony,7 while at
common law it was a misdemeanor.8 Sentences currently im-
posed upon a convicted kidnapper are severe-death or life
imprisonment, often without possibility of parole.' The severity
1 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 219.
2 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 13-1-22 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.01 (1)(a)
(West 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 14:44-45 (West 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.25
(West 1963).
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-492 (Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:44-
45 (West 1974); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.225, 163.235 (1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit.
5, § 20.04 (Vernon 1974).
1 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-492 (Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.225, .235
(1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 20.04 (Vernon 1974).
5 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 10-2 (Supp. 1977).
' Further, there is no requirement that interstate boundaries be involved. 1 AM.
JUR. 2d Abduction and Kidnapping § 1 (1962).
7 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 371, at 737 (1957).
Classification as a felony is even more likely if the kidnapping is aggravated, i.e.,
if ransom is demanded or the victim suffers bodily harm. See the definitions of aggra-
vated kidnapping in text accompanying notes 3-5, supra.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 1.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (West 1972).
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of the punishment makes the possibility of a frivolous kidnap-
ping charge particularly noxious. In its pure form, kidnapping
may be said to be the crime of abduction. However, abduction
alone is rarely the motivation for a kidnapping offense. Rather,
some other criminal offense, such as a desire to extort money,
almost universally accompanies the abduction. Further, in ju-
risdictions which define kidnapping in terms of unlawful re-
straint, a technical kidnapping occurs with the commission of
any rape or robbery. 0
One way in which the law has traditionally attempted to
limit the scope, of kidnapping is by requiring an element of
asportation in addition to mere restraint of the victim." But
the asportation requirement itself may become a technicality
that does not indicate any greater risk to the victim than does
the primary offense (such as rape, robbery, or assault) being
committed." Thus several states, including Kentucky, have
found the asportation requirement ineffective in limiting the
crime of kidnapping and have accordingly adopted new ap-
proaches to meet the problem in their respective jurisdictions.
Kentucky has a unique solution to limiting the definition
of kidnapping-an exemption has been enacted in the Ken-
tucky Penal Code. 3 This exemption is designed to prevent kid-
napping charges where the conduct of a suspect has "no crimi-
nological significance to the evil towards which kidnapping is
10 KENTUCKY PENAL CODE § 509.050, Comment (1974) (BALDWIN'S CRIMINAL LAW OF
Ky. 1975).
Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLUM. L. Rv. 540, 544 (1953).
12 Id. at 556-57. Perhaps the best-known illustration of this point is People v.
Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1951). In that case, the California Supreme
Court upheld the kidnapping conviction of a defendant who forced his rape victim to
move 22 feet to his automobile.
'1 Ky. REv. STAT. § 509.050 (1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. The exemption
states:
A person may not be convicted of unlawful imprisonment in the first
degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, or kidnapping when his
criminal purpose is the commission of an offense defined outside this chapter
[Kidnapping and Related Offenses] and his interference with the victim's
liberty occurs immediately with and incidental to the commission of that
offense, unless the interference exceeds that which is ordinarily incident to
the commission of the offense which is the objective of his criminal purpose.
The exemption provided by this section is not applicable to the charge of
kidnapping that arises from an interference with another's liberty that oc-
curs incidental to the commission of a criminal escape.
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directed." 4 The application of this exemption can best be seen
from an examination of the only two cases which directly in-
volve the exemption.' 5 In Calloway v. Commonwealth,'6 the
Kentucky Supreme Court refused to apply the exemption
where the defendant drove a woman from Kentucky to Indiana
and admittedly raped and robbed her.'7 In the second case,
Timmons v. Commonwealth, 8 the justices complained of the
exemption's ambiguity and declared that it "will be construed
strictly and restrictively unless and until it be amended."' 9
The effect these decisions will have on the Kentucky exemption
can best be understood by examining attempts to limit the
offense in other jurisdictions and the rationale behind Ken-
tucky's solution.
II. STATUTORY EFFORTS TO LIMIT KIDNAPPING LAW
A. The Model Penal Code and Other Jurisdictions
The Model Penal Code provides one approach to limiting
kidnapping charges: Its definition of the crime requires an ele-
ment of confinement "for a substantial period in a place of
isolation." 20 This provision, requiring somewhat more than a
purely technical detention, has been adopted by Maine2' and
Pennsylvania. 22 New York adopted the Model Penal Code con-
cept, but replaced "substantial period" with "for a period of
more than twelve hours. ' 23 Although this specified time period
is recognized as arbitrary, it "represents an attempt to desig-
" KENTUCKY PENAL CODE § 509.050, Comment (1974) (BALDWIN'S CRIMINAL LAW OF
Ky. 1975).
," Another case indirectly involving the exemption provision reached the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals this year. In Bishop v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 519 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1977), convictions of first-degree robbery and kidnapping were upheld
where the defendant forced a store manager to accompany him after the defendant
had robbed a supermarket. The exemption issue was not raised during the trial, but
only on appeal, where the actual question was whether the defendant had received
competent counsel. Since the kidnapping exemption was not directly at issue even on
appeal, the case will not be dealt with in this comment.
,S 550 S.W.2d 501 (Ky. 1977).
, Id. at 502-03.
" 555 S.W.2d 234 (Ky. 1977).
Id. at 241.
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
21 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 301 (1976).
22 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2901 (Purdon 1973).
22 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.25 (McKinney 1975).
[Vol. 66
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nate a point in the course of such a criminal project at which
the abduction becomes a major offense in itself and not merely
a facet of some other crime.
'2 4
As an alternative to the substantial period provision,
Maine and Pennsylvania also define kidnapping to require an
asportation involving a substantial distance.25 Again, this is
designed to "avoid having kidnapping include what is essen-
tially only robbery when the robber forces the victim into a
nearby hallway in order to take his wallet and watch.
'" 26
However, the most widely-adopted approach to limiting
kidnapping is to define the elements of the offense in such a
way that more than either a technical detention or asportation
is clearly required. Thus Arkansas,2 Connecticut,
28 Delaware, 29
Indiana, 0 and Oregon 3l define kidnapping in terms of conduct
that "substantially interferes with another's liberty." Minimal
restraints on the victim's liberty, such as those inherently pres-
ent in rape and robbery, are thus excluded from the definition
of kidnapping under such statutes. None of the statutes pur-
ports to forbid prosecution for kidnapping arising out of a rape
or robbery case; but "[iut is only when the restraint exceeds
that normally incidental to the crime that the rapist or robber
should also be subject to prosecution for kidnapping."
' 2
B. Kentucky's Exemption Statute
Although Kentucky's Penal Code also defines "restrain" in
terms of substantial interference,33 it reflects a unique ap-
proach to the problem of limiting kidnapping charges. A sepa-
rate exemption statute forbids conviction for kidnapping or
related offenses in cases where the defendant's "interference
with the victim's liberty occurs immediately with and inciden-
24 N.Y. PENAL LAW, Note to § 135.25 (McKinney 1975).
11 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 301 (1976); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AN. § 2901
(Purdon 1973).
21 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, Note to § 301 (1976).
2 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1702 (1976).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-91 (1975).
2 DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 786 (1975).
' IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-3-1 (Supp. 1976).
:' OR. REV. STAT. § 163.225 (1975).
22 ARK. STAT. ANN., Note to § 41-1702 (1975).
3 KRS § 509.010 (2) (1975).
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tal to" the primary offense being committed, unless the inter-
ference exceeds that "which is the objective of his criminal
purpose." 34
The commentary to the exemption explains the rationale
behind the statute:
The provision seeks to express a policy against the use
of kidnapping to impose sanctions upon conduct which in-
volves a movement or confinement (of another person) that
has no criminological significance to the evil toward which
kidnapping is directed. It then provides a flexible standard
by which the courts are to enforce that policy. Before criminal
behavior that is directed toward the completion of robbery,
rape, or some other offense can constitute kidnapping, there
must be an interference with liberty in excess of that which
ordinarily accompanies the offense.35
While no one would suggest that the exemption seeks to
free rapists and robbers, it may be argued that the provision
could effectively reduce the punishment for such crimes. Pro-
fessor Brickey addresses this issue when she says, "Although
particularly aggravated cases may arouse public furor, the
criminal law must be rationally structured so as to provide
adequately harsh penalties.in the appropriate cases and to
minimize the potential for abusive discretionary judgments
regarding sentencing."36 Thus the problem is one basic to
every penal system: providing criminal sanctions commensu-
rate with the conduct and culpability of the offender. It is un-
deniably more consistent with the ideals of justice to impose
lesser punishment for what society deems to be lesser crimes
than to stretch the definitions of several offenses to secure
multiple charges against a defendant. If the punishment for
rape and robbery is considered too lenient, it would be better
to increase the sentences for those crimes than to superimpose
harsher penalties under the guise of a kidnapping conviction.37
Kentucky's kidnapping exemption, like the approaches
adopted by other states, does not suggest that convictions for
' KRS § 509.050 (1975).
" KENTUCKY PENAL CODE § 509.050, Comment (1975) (BALDwiN's CRIINAL LAW OF
Ky. 1975).
" K. BRICKEY, KENTUCKY CRIMINAL LAW § 10.06 (1974).
31 Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLUM. L. Rsv. 540, 556 n.99
(1953).
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kidnapping and some other substantive crime can never stem
from the same criminal conduct; if the interference with the
victim's liberty exceeds that ordinarily incidental to the of-
fense, the exemption does not apply.
38
Im. KENTUCKY CASES
A. Calloway v. Commonwealth
Whether application of the kidnapping exemption would
be justified by the facts of the case was a major issue in
Calloway v. Commonwealth,39 although the facts themselves
were undisputed. Robert Calloway and two other men forced a
woman into her automobile at a mall parking lot in Owensboro.
Calloway then drove the car across a bridge into Indiana, where
the three men raped the woman and took thirty dollars from
her. The defendant afterwards drove the car back into Ken-
tucky where the car was abandoned in a cemetery with the
victim inside." The entire episode lasted approximately one
hour.4
Since the rape and robbery occured in Indiana, Calloway
could not be charged with those offenses in Kentucky. He was
charged, however, with kidnapping," and he defended by as-
serting that his actions fell with the exemption statute.13 The
trial court refused to submit an instruction to the jury on the
exemption; Calloway was subsequently convicted and sent-
enced to twenty years' imprisonment.4
3- KRS § 509.050 (1975). For the text of the statute, see note 13, supra.
3, 550 S.W.2d 501 (Ky. 1977).
" Id. at 502-03.
Id. at 504 (dissenting opinion).
42 KRS § 509.040(1) (1975) provides:
A person is guilty of kidnapping when he unlawfully restrains another person
and when his intent is:
(a) to hold him for ransom or reward; or
(b) To accomplish or to advance the commission of a felony; or
(c) To inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or another; or
(d) To interfere with the performance of a governmental or political
function; or
(e) To use him as a shield or a hostage.
The trial court instructed under (b), rape and robbery being the applicable felonies.
13 Calloway v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Ky. 1977).
" Id. at 502. Calloway also urged on appeal that improper remarks by the trial
court to the jury denied him a fair trial, but that issue has no relevance to the kidnap-
ping question.
1977]
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On appeal, Kentucky's Supreme Court upheld the denial
of the instruction, ruling that the application of the exemption
statute is "to be determined by the trial court and not by a jury
in the absence of standards by which a jury could make such a
determination."" And, more significantly, the Court ruled that
the exemption did not have "any application at all in the cir-
cumstances" of the case.46 However, the Court split in the deci-
sion, with four justices joining in the majority, two concurring
in result only, and one dissenting. It may be instructive, there-
fore, to consider the basic issue before the Court and to evalu-
ate the merits of the decision.
Both the majority and dissent focused on the legislative
intent as evidenced by the commentary to the Penal Code in
reaching their respective decisions. Justice Stephenson, writing
for the majority, found that the purpose of the statute "is to
act as a restraint on abusive prosecution by Kentucky
authorities in charging kidnapping or degrees of unlawful im-
prisonment in addition to charges of rape, robbery, etc., all of
which occur in Kentucky."47 He further found that the Ken-
tucky authorities in this case charged "the only offense com-
mitted in this jurisdiction"48 and reasoned that there could be
no prosecutorial abuse under these facts, since Kentucky au-
thorities were not making the charge to secure greater punitive
sanctions against the defendant. 9 On the basis of these find-
ings, the majority held that the exemption statute "is applica-
ble only to the charge of kidnapping or degrees of unlawful
imprisonment made in conjunction with other charged offenses
committed in this jurisdiction. "I'
In his dissent, Justice Palmore reached a different inter-
pretation of the Penal Code commentary. While agreeing that
the drafters were attempting to reduce the possibility of prose-
cutorial abuse,5' Palmore found more significance in the state-
ment that "[K]idnapping convictions are precluded for con-
finements which .. do not exceed in length and character the
's Id. at 503.
SId.
4 Id. (emphasis in original).
4' Id.
jg Id.
50 Id. (emphasis added).
' Id., dissent at 504.
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type of confinement which ordinarily accompany such offen-
ses." 2 Thus Justice Palmore felt the exemption should apply.
Despite heavy reliance on the commentary by both sides
of the Court, it appears that the majority and dissent were
writing about distinctly different things. While the majority
was searching for the possibility of abuse in the form of multi-
ple or augmented charges, the dissent recognized the fact of
abuse in any kidnapping charges under the circumstances.
The weakness of the majority opinion is evidenced by Ste-
phenson's observation (in dictum) that, had the entire episode
happened in Kentucky, the authorities would ordinarily "be
satisfied with charges of rape and robbery and not be disposed
to pile on additional charges. . . ,,13 If kidnapping were
charged under such circumstances, Stephenson stated, the
trial court then would have to determine if the exemption stat-
ute was applicable." The opinion does not make clear, how-
ever, why it would be an abuse to charge kidnapping in con-
junction with other crimes when it would not be an abuse to
make the charge alone in the same set of circumstances. Either
a prosecutor has legitimate grounds for making a kidnapping
charge, or he has none; the fact of the crime cannot rest on the
absence of other charges. Kidnapping is not a lesser included
offense (such as conspiracy to commit a particular crime) to be
charged only when the substantive offense does not material-
ize; kidnapping is the substantive offense when it occurs. The
Court's suggestion, therefore, that whether there was a kidnap-
ping depends upon whether there was a rape is clearly un-
sound.
It could be argued that the Indiana and Kentucky prosecu-
tions together would create a risk of prosecutorial abuse. How-
ever, the Court dismissed this issue by focusing only upon the
Kentucky charges; since Calloway would be tried under Indi-
ana law, the 'Court felt that abuse by Kentucky authorities
would be impossible." This reflects a narrow, technical reading
of the Penal Code commentary that fails to give fair considera-
tion to the evident legislative intent. The commentary and the
52 Id. (emphasis in original).
-" Id. at 503.
38 Id.
55 Id.
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text of the exemption make clear the purpose behind the stat-
ute: to discourage kidnapping charges in cases where the crime
occurs only technically.
B. Timmons v. Commonwealth
In Timmons v. Commonwealth,"6 the second case to arise
under the exemption statute, the Court unanimously refused
to apply the exemption. Because Timmons involved the mur-
der of a three-year-old boy whose body was found some dist-
ance from his home five days after he was reported missing, the
case can be distinguished from Calloway: Factually Timmons
presents a stronger case for denying the exemption.
Timmons is important, however, because the Court fo-
cused on the language of the exemption statute that forbids
convicting a person of kidnapping or unlawful imprisonment
where the defendant's "interference with the victim's liberty
occurs immediately with and incidental to the commission of
that offense, unless the interference exceeds that which is ordi-
narily incident to the commission of that offense which is the
objective of his criminal purpose."5 Justice Palmore, the dis-
senter in Calloway, wrote for the Court in Timmons:
[Wie think it might have been well for the drafters
simply to omit the 'unless' clause, because it is hard to see
how a restraint could be 'immediately with and incidental to'
the commission of another offense and at the same time ex-
ceed that which is ordinarily incident to the commission of
such other offense. The consensus view of the court is to
resolve the ambiguity in favor of the 'immediately with and
incidental to' phraseology, which means that the statute will
be construed strictly and restrictively unless and until it be
amended to the contrary. Therefore, if the victim of a crime
is going to be restrained of his liberty in order to facilitate its
commission, the restraint will have to be close in distance
and brief in time in order for the exemption to apply. If the
victim is restrained and transported any substantial distance
to or from the place at which the crime is committed or to
be committed, the offender will be guilty of an unlawful im-
prisonment offense as well.5
' 555 S.W.2d 234 (Ky. 1977).
KRS § 509.050 (1975).
Timmons v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d at 240-41.
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The decision in Timmons again reflects a narrow reading
of the exemption statute, but not an unfair one. The
"immediately with and incidental to" test used by the Court
certainly leaves room for realization of the legislative intent to
eliminate purely technical kidnappings. Had the majority used
this test in Calloway, it seems they would have joined Justice
Palmore in finding that the restraint of the victim was only
incidental to the rape and robbery. Thus, under the test ex-
pressed in Timmons, the kidnapping exemption should have
been applied in Calloway.
CONCLUSION
Neither the actual test set out in Timmons nor the refusal
to apply the exemption to the facts of that particular case
weakens the exemption provision. However, the holding in
Calloway is not so benign. Calloway presented, factually at
least, an excellent opportunity for the Court to bring the Ken-
tucky exemption provision to life. Instead, an hour-long deten-
tion with the admitted purpose of committing rape and robbery
became kidnapping when the defendant crossed the state line.
Because the Court did not apply the exemption, future
application of the provision may be considerably restricted.
Specifically, the ruling denies application of the provision
where kidnapping is the only crime charged in Kentucky. This
may lead to some absurd results in applying the rule of
Calloway. For example, a robber who pulls his victim across
the state line and detains him for three or four minutes presum-
ably could be charged with kidnapping, so long as he is not also
charged with robbery; it is difficult to perceive why the robber's
action should be deemed any more or less culpable because of
an arbitrary state boundary.
What makes kidnapping a dangerous crime and one de-
serving of serious punishment is the increased threat to the
victim's safety when he is removed from public surroundings
and confined where no help is likely to reach him. In ransom
kidnappings, the kidnapper's efforts to extort money will invar-
iably involve threats to harm or kill the victim."9 But these evils
are not deterred by kidnapping charges levied against defen-
1, Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 CoLuM. L. REv. 540, 557 (1953).
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dants who never had the intent to kidnap.
These arguments have been recognized by the drafters of
the Kentucky Penal Code and the exemption has been offered
as a possible answer to the problem. It is unfortunate that in
Calloway the Court chose not to utilize the approach provided
by the statute. Although the Court clothed its decision in the
language of the Penal Code commentary, the Calloway decision
seems to thwart legislative intent. Thus Calloway can be
viewed as yet another illustration of the need to limit kidnap-
ping law.
Anne Adams Chesnut
